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The Courts and Reapportionment:
The Exemption of Judicial Elections
By PHILIP L. MARIwn0
In recent years, reapportionment has been one of the most
persistent and perplexing questions confronting American courts.
When, in 1962, the Supreme Court abandoned its long standing
practice of avoiding legislative representation issues as political
questions subject to the doctrine of judicial restraint,' confusion
and uncertainty followed because of two problems: first, the lack
of guiding precedents and second, the diverse patterns of electoral
schemes used by state and local governments which could not
be easily categorized for standardizing solutions. It thus became
necessary for the Court to fashion guidelines for achieving
equitable apportionment. The initial step was taken in 1964
when the "one man, one vote" requirement was formulated for
congressional districts2 and state legislatures.' Then, in 1968,
this principle was applied to local governments of general powers,4
and two years later the coverage was completed as special dis-
tricts were included under the equality principle.5
The Quest for Equality
Defining the constitutional parameters of equal representation
the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims0 said:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires that a State make an
honest and good effort to construct districts, in both houses of
its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.
We realize that it is a practical impossibility to arrange legisla-
* Professor of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute; B.S. 1957,
V.P.I.; M.A. 1957, Ph.D. 1965, University of North Carolina.
iBaker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).2 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
3 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
4 Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
5 Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
6 377 U.S. 533 (1970).
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tive districts so that each one has an identical number of resi-
dents, or citizens, or voters. Mathematical exactness or pre-
cision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement.7
In a subsequent case the Court reasoned that in a multi-
district county, state senators elected in a county at-large system
pursuant to a district residence requirement were as much the
delegates of the entire county as of the district in which they
resided.8 However, the Court took a tougher position several
years later when it warned that anything larger than "de mini-
mus" variations in the population among state legislative districts
must be justified by an "acceptable state policy."9
The most stringent statements concerning congressional dis-
tricting were made in Wells v. Rockefeller'0 and Kirkpatrjck v.
Preisler," both of which emphasized strict adherence to the con-
cept of "one man, one vote." Prior to these decisions it has been
thought that variances among districts were justified by:
... [a] legitimate regard for such factors as the representation
of distinct interest groups, the integrity of county lines, the
compactness of districts, the population trends within the
State, the high proportion of military personnel, college stu-
dents, and other nonvoters in some districts, and the political
realities of "legislative interplay."12
Yet in Kirkpatrick, this argument was almost completely rejected
because the Supreme Court, instead of recognizing the need for
or the possibility of flexible arrangements, insisted that under
the "as nearly as practicable" standard contained in Reynolds, a
state should make "a good faith effort to achieve precise mathe-
matical equality" because "[e]qual representation for equal num-
bers of people is a principle designed to prevent debasement of
voting power and diminution of access to elected representa-
tid. at 577 (emphasis added).8 Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). According to Professor Dixon,
the significance of this decision was much less than originally thought because
"[ilt was not widely realized that plaintiffs' contentions were very narrow and
did not reach the crucial issue of unfair impact on political representation needs
in the multimember counties, flowing from the winner-take-all aspect of the at-
large election system." R. DrION, DEMOCRATIC REPEsENTATIoN: .rArpOTION-
MENT ll LAw AND POLrrIcs 477 (1968).
9 Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967).10 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
11894 U.S. 526 (1969).
12 Id. at 530.
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fives." 3 It was stressed that "[tioleration of even small deviations
detracts from these purposes."1 4 Therefore, contrary to the
guidelines in Reynolds, the Kirkpatfick and Wells decisions em-
phasized that mathematical exactness or precision is a workable
constitutional requirement which is to be given priority over all
other factors in redistricting.
In contrast to congressional apportionment, local government
has been accorded a special status which under certain conditions
permits population deviation among the districts of an electoral
scheme as long as discrimination is not being practiced. This
distinction was enunciated in Abate v. Mundt,5 which involved
challenges to population inequality and multi-member districting
in Rockland County, New York, where, for more than a hundred
years, the governing board had been composed of the supervisors
of the county's five towns.16 Since these municipalities were of
varying size, there was a total deviation from population equality
among the districts of 11.9 per cent. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, was willing to accept this departure from the "one man,
one vote" concept partly in deference to the interest of preserving
the 'long history of, and perceived need for, close cooperation
between the county and its constituent towns."17 It was further
conceded that the population differences contained in local
apportionment systems should not always be governed by the
rules applying to national and state legislative districting 'because
'local legislative bodies frequently have fewer representatives
than do their state and national counterparts and ... some local
legislative districts may have a much smaller population than do
congressional and state legislative districts.... ,,-t
Although an exception to mathematical stringency was ap-
proved by the Abate decision, it was not an unqualified endorse-
ment of flexibility. Not only did the Court reserve for future
resolution the question of how much variance is constitutionally
permissible, but it also noted that exceptions to the Reynolds
principle could be accepted only if the "particular circumstances
13 Id. at 581.
14 Id.
15 403 U.S. 182 (1971).16 For a detailed analysis of this case, see Martin, The Constitutional Status of
Local Government Reappointment, 6 VALPAuAisO L. REV. 237, 246-52 (1972).17 Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 186 (1971).
18 Id. at 185.
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and needs of a local community as a whole... justify departures
from strict equality." 9 Therefore, the New York ruling was
based "on the long tradition of overlapping function and dual
personnel in Rockland County government and on the fact that
the plan . . . does not contain a built-in bias tending to favor
particular political interests or geographic areas."20 The Abate
rationale was subsequently extended to state legislative districting.
In Mahan v. Howell,21 the Supreme Court held that deviation as
great as 16 percent is justifiable if this is the only way the history
and tradition of representation for a state's subdivisions can be
preserved.
Thus the Reynolds' standard has acquired two meanings: for
congressional apportionment, it demands mathematical precision,
as Kirkpatrick and Wells emphasize; for state and local apportion-
ment, vaguely less than mathematical exactness is required, as
Abate and Mahan indicate. This duality of standards and the ad
hoc exemptions for special categories have caused much of the
criticism of judicial intervention in reapportionment. In the area
of judicial redistricting, the Court has not finalized its position,
but three recent cases22 make it clear that the election of judges
is subject to yet another standard. Before examining these cases,
however, it is necessary to review Hadley v. Junior College Dis-
trict23 which was the basis for both the challenge to judicial
elections and its rejection in court.
Hadley Revisited
Constituting the third phase in the Supreme Court's category
of local government rulings, the Hadley case was concerned with
the apportionment of six elected trustees among the constituencies
of the Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas City.24
The crux of this complaint was that the electoral scheme assigned
19 Id.
201d. at 187.
21 - U.S. - (1973).
22 Kaplan v. Milliken, - U.S. - (1973); Wells v. Edwards, - U.S.
- (1973); Holshouser v. Scott, - U.S. - (1973) (discussed infra).
233 97 U.S. 50 (1970).24 The cases concerning local reapportionment from 1967-70 are analyzed in
Martin, The Supreme Court and Local Reapportionment: The Third Phase, 39 GEo.
WAsH. L. Rzv. 102 (1970). For a specific discussion of Hadley v. Junior College
Dist., see Id. at 111-16.
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only three trustees to the district containing approximately 60
percent of the total enumeration used for determining how much
representation should be given to each constituency.25 Designed
to equalize voting power among units of disproportionate popu-
lations, the plan was nevertheless found to be defective since it
"necessarily results in a systematic discrimination against voters
in the more populous school districts." 26 It was thus concluded
that "[s]uch built-in discrimination against voters in large districts
cannot be sustained as a sufficient compliance with the con-
stitutional mandate that each person's vote count as much as
another's, as far as practicable."27
Although this controversy involved only governments of
special powers, the decision was unusual because its effect
extended beyond the immediate question. In an effort to elimi-
nate the uncertainty arising from the case by case approach to
state and local reapportionment, a general rule was formulated:
Whenever a state or local government decides to select per-
sons by popular election to perform governmental functions,
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires that each qualified voter must be given an equal op-
portunity to participate in that election, and when members of
an elected body are chosen from separate districts, each dis-
trict must be established on a basis that will insure, as far as
is practicable, that equal numbers of voters can vote for pro-
portionally equal number of officials.28
This pronouncement was intended to end speculation about
which types of governmental arrangements were included under
the Reynolds requirement; instead, it reopened the issue of
judicial elections which had supposedly been decided by several
lower federal court cases.29 In addition, the implementation of
this rule was weakened by the qualification that "there might
be some case in which a State elects certain functionaries whose
2 5 Tbe formula for computing the enumeration was:
The population between ages six and 20 for an individual district
the population between ages six and 20 for the entire district =
enumeration (expressed as a percentage). Mo. ANN. STAT. § 167.011
(1959).2 6 Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 897 U.S. 50, 57 (1970).
27 Id.
281d. at 56.
29 See text at notes 83-85 infra.
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duties are so far removed from normal governmental activities
and so disproportionately affect different groups that a popular
election in compliance with Reynolds... might not be required.
S. .," Despite the defendant's claim, the trustees of the junior
college district were not considered to fall within the excepted
category because "[e]ducation has traditionally been a vital gov-
ernmental function, and these trustees, whose election the State
has opened to all qualified voters, are governmental officials in
every relevant sense of that term."" Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court did not specify what types of elections would be exempted
from the Hadley rule, and, as a result, this caveat has become a
central point in the latest rulings for state judicial elections.
judges are Exempt-The Aftermath of Reynolds
After the Reynolds mandate was announced, the question
immediately arose as to the inclusion of judicial elections. In
Stokes v. FortsonP2 a challenge was filed against Georgia which
uses a combination of elections and residency requirements to
choose its trial court judges on a partisan ballot. To begin with,
the state is divided into judicial circuits, and candidacy for judge-
ships is restricted to the residents of each circuit.13 A primary
is held in every circuit after which all nominees stand in a state-
wide election even though the judges only serve in the area from
which they are nominated.34 Since there was a disparity in popu-
lation among the judicial circuits, a violation of the "one man,
one vote" standard was asserted; however, the federal district
court rejected this claim by noting that each voter in a circuit
casts an equal ballot in the nominating process and all voters
cast equal ballots in the state election. The Georgia system for
selecting trial judges was deemed to afford proper recognition
to all interests inasmuch as the residence requirement and the
nomination are combined with the statewide election.
According to the court's interpretation, the primary mandate
of the reapportionment rule is that there must not be a dilution
of voting power, and the Georgia judicial electoral system was
30 Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970).
s' Id.32234 F. Supp. 575 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
3 3 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2608 (1963). -
84 GA. CONST. arL. VI, § 3, 1111 , 2.
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deemed to meet this requirement. But, in the event that this con-
struction was incorrect, the Reynolds principle was also adjudged
inapplicable in the Georgia case on the grounds that even if
there is a difference in voting power because the population of
election districts varies, the election of judges, who are not
representatives in the same sense as legislators, is not controlled
by the equality doctrine since a judge's "function is to administer
the law, not to espouse the cause of a particular constituency."35
Moreover, responding to the implicit argument that the size of
judicial districts be related to case loads, the court concluded
that:
... [T]here is no way to harmonize selection of these officials
[judges] on a pure population standard with the diversity in
type and number of cases which will arise in various localities,
or with the varying abilities of judges . . . to dispatch the
business of the courts. An effort to apply a population stan-
dard to the judiciary would, in the end, fall of its own weight.36
The logic of this point coupled with the functional difference
between judges and legislators has had an imposing influence in
later cases affecting judicial elections.
Two subsequent cases were also concerned with the question
of applying the "one man, one vote" concept to the apportionment
of judges among their circuits and districts. Although no elections
were involved, it was alleged that unless a state distributed its
judges on a per capita basis the more populous urban districts
were being denied speedy justice while rural counties were being
given preferential treatment. Relying on Stokes as precedent,
this contention was rejected in both cases because there was no
voting dilution. In Ohio, the federal district court dismissed the
notion that the "one man, one vote" standard was applicable to
courts as well as legislatures by emphasizing that "[jiudges do not
represent people, they serve people."3 7 One year later a federal
district court in New York agreed that "[t]he State judiciary,
unlike the legislature, is not the organ responsible for achieving
representative government" ' Since the Supreme Court refused
3 5 Stokes v. Fortson, 284 F. Supp. 575, 577 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
s6 Id.
3 7 Buchanan v. Rhodes, 249 F. Supp. 860, 865 (N.D. Ohio 1966), appeal dis-
missed, 885 U.S. 8 (1966).
38 New York State Ass'n of Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp. 148,
153 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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to review the Ohio decision, 9 the "case load" question seems to
be settled, but the issue of population equality and judicial elec-
tions did not end with Stokes.
Are Judges Exempt?-The Aftermath of Hadley
Revived by the general rule enunciated in Hadley, two more
efforts were made to bring the election of judges under the aegis
of Reynolds. The first of these cases, Hoishouser v. Scott,40 sought
to invalidate a North Carolina electoral plan similar to the one
upheld in Stokes. Using a partisan ballot, trial court judges were
nominated by a primary conducted in their residential district
and then elected on a statewide basis.41 Referring to the Georgia
decision,42 a three-judge federal panel approved the North Car-
olina system by a two to one vote. The dissenter, however,
thought there was a significant distinction from the Georgia
precedent in that North Carolina's 30 judicial districts are com-
bined into four geographic divisions with the trial judges rotating
among the districts of their divisions. Consequently, the judges
serve not only the people who nominated them but also people
within divisions who had no voice in the nomination process.
Since the scheme establishes two groups of voters, those within
a district and those outside a district, the dissent contended that
the second group is treated unconstitutionally because of non-
participation in the primary elections. It was thus concluded:
That each voter can participate fully in the election of the
[trial court] judge from his own district does not satisfy his
admitted interest in choosing other.., judges who will func-
tion throughout the state.43
Disagreeing with this view, the HoIshouser majority said:
We hold that the one man, one vote rule does not apply
to the state judiciary and therefore a mere showing of a dis-
parity among the voters or in the population figures of the
district would not be sufficient to strike down this election
39 Buchanan v. Rhodes, 249 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Ohio 1966), appeal dismissed,
385 U.S. 3 (1966).
40 335 F. Supp. 928 (M.D.N.C. 1971), aff'd, - U.S. - (1972).
41 N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 16.42 Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575 (N.D. Ga. 1964); see text at notes
32-36 supra.43 Holshouser v. Scott, 835 F. Supp. 928, 935 (M.D.N.C. 1971).
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procedure ..... A showing of an arbitrary and capricious or
invidious action or distinction between citizens and voters
would be required. In other words, this court must find that
the State has not only distinguished between citizens and
voters, but that such distinctions are arbitrary and capricious
or invidious.44
This ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court in a memorandum
decision,45 thereby ending speculation about whether the Reynolds
requirement applied to this kind of judicial election; but, the
Supreme Court was not unanimous with regard to a complete
exemption.
In the subsequent case of Wells v. Edwards," the Supreme
Court divided six to three over the applicability of the "one man,
one vote" standard to the election of the Louisiana Supreme
Court. This case differed from Stokes and Holshouser inasmuch
as the seven Louisiana Supreme Court justices are elected from
six districts, one of which is assigned two justices.4 7 Since there
was no statewide election involved as in the Georgia and North
Carolina cases, the Wells dissenters insisted that the Louisiana
electoral plan based on districts be evaluated in accordance with
Reynolds and not according to the Georgia and North Carolina
cases. 4  The district population disparity challenged in Wells
ranged from 369,485 to 682,072 for the five single-judge districts
with the two-judge sixth district having a population of 1,007,449.
The three-judge federal panel, which first heard the case and
with whom the Wells majority agreed, noted that there was
"considerable deviation between the population of some of the
districts," but it did not attach any significance to this fact in its
ruling.49 In contrast, the Supreme Court dissenters criticized
the population differential on the grounds that the "votes of some
qualified voters, depending on the happenstance of residence,
were of less value in electing justices than others, cast else-
where."O
Why did the lower court disregard population, the major
44Id. at 938.
45 Holshouser v. Scott, 409 U.S. 807 (1972).
46 -U.S. (1973).
4 7 LA. CoNsT. art. VII, § 9.
48Wells v. Edwards, - U.S. , (1973) (dissenting opinion).49 Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453, 454 (M.D. La. 1972).50 Wells v. Edwards, - U.S. - , - (1973) (dissenting opinion).
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factor incorporated from the Reynolds philosophy by the Hadley
pronouncement? To begin with, this court agreed with the
earlier decisions that "the rationale behind the one man, one
vote principle, which evolved out of efforts to preserve a truly
representative form of government, is simply not relevant to the
makeup of the judiciary."" Yet, this statement did not constitute
sufficient grounds in itself to dismiss the plaintiff's contention
that the judiciary was included under the Hadley rule.5 2 The
special court, while acknowledging the broad language of the
Hadley decision, referred to the caveat regarding the exemption
from reapportionment mathematics given certain governmental
officials whose duties are "far removed from normal governmental
activities."53 All three judges agreed that the Louisiana system
fell into this category. Therefore, it was concluded that even
though there was substantial population variance among the
Louisiana districts, the plaintiff's argument for including the
state supreme court election under the Hadley rule was in appro-
priate because:
[I]n Hadley, as in every other case that we can find dealing
with the question of apportionment, the "governmental func-
tions" related to such things as making laws, levying and
collecting taxes, issuing bonds, hiring and firing personnel,
making contracts, collecting fees, operating schools, and
generally managing and governing people. In other words,
apportionment cases have always dealt with elected officials
who performed legislative or executive type duties, and in no
case has the one-man, one-vote principle been extended to
the judiciary. On the contrary, several cases have specifically
held that principle does not apply to the judiciary.5 4
The Supreme Court dissenters distinguished the use of district
elections from the statewide ballot at issue in Stokes and Hols-
houser55 and criticized the lower court's reliance on the Hadley
caveat. They asserted that this qualification did not delineate
among the elected officers of government because:
Judges are not private citizens who are sought out by their
51 Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453, 455 (M.D. La. 1972).
52 See text at note 28 supra.
53 See text at note 30 supra.54 Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453, 455 (M.D. La. 1972).
55 See text at notes 32-36, 40-44 supra.
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litigious neighbors to pass upon their disputes. They are state
officials, vested with state powers and elected (or appointed)
to carry out the state government's judicial function. As such,
they most certainly 'perform governmental functions.'56
This conclusion was supported by reference to Gray v. Sanders7
in which the Supreme Court had invalidated the Georgia county
unit system that had been used in the Democratic Party primary
elections for all governmental officials, including judges, who run
on a statewide ticket. Writing for the dissenters, Justice White
pointed out that the Court had not considered the county unit
system any less unconstitutional for the election of judges than
for the election of United States Senators.
Concerning the Hadley rule,58 the dissenters interpreted it
as providing very narrow exceptions to the requirement that once
a state decides to elect officials by popular vote, "each qualified
voter must be treated with an equal hand and not be subjected
to irrational discrimination based on his residence."59 Moreover,
it was indicated by way of illustration that although the office of
junior college trustee differs in certain respects from that of judge,
the distinction is immaterial because when both are elected,
especially by districts, Hadley applies. In other words, the Con-
stitution does not authorize such differentiation, and it is the
duty of the Supreme Court to protect the right of equal vote
regardless of the officials selected. Therefore, the dissenters con-
tended that the issue of the Louisiana case had been misunder-
stood by the majority and that its questions warranted "plenary
review" rather than an affirmation of the lower court's decision.
Nevertheless, judicial elections are exempt from the idea of "one
person, one vote," 0 and the cases supporting the exemption con-
tinue to grow.6 '
6 Wells v. Edwards, - U.S. , (1973) (dissenting opinion).
57 372 U.S. 368 (1963).5s See text at note 28 supra.
59 Wells v. Edwards, - U.S. , (1973) (dissenting opinion).60 Presumably as a result of the equal rights movement for women, Justice
White in the Wells case changed the Reynolds principle to "one person, one vote."01 In Kaplan v. Milliken, - U.S. - (1973), the Court reafrirmed a lower
courts reliance on Wells in dismissing a challenge to Kentucky's scheme for
electing judges. The judges of the Kentucky Court of Appeals are elected by dis-
trict ballot from seven districts which were alleged to be malapportioned. Since
only Justices Marshall and White dissented from the Court's decision to dismiss, it
is apparent that the exemption from "one man, one vote' given state judiciaries
has been strengthened.
1973]
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The Contradiction of ludicial Elections by District
It is obvious that the series of cases ending with Holshouser
v. Scott were correctly decided according to the precedents
because the use of a statewide election eliminates the constitu-
tional problems arising from the use of a district plan. And, even
if in the interest of more effective administration of justice the
courts should reconsider the question, there is currently no basis
for challenging the relationship between case load, population
and the number of judges assigned to a circuit. However, in none
of the cases concerning judicial elections or the allocation of
judges has there been an accurate understanding of the Supreme
Court's original intention for reapportionment. Only the dis-
senters in Wells have properly read the mandate of Gray v.
Sanders62 as including administrative, executive and judicial
officers as well as legislators, and this point is reinforced by a
statement made in Sailors v. Board of Education.6 3 Speaking for
a unanimous Court, Justice Douglas gave the following summary:
At least as respects non-legislative officers, a State can appoint
local officials or elect them or combine the elective and appoin-
tive system as was done here. If we assume arguendo that
where a State provides for an election of a local official or
agency-whether administrative, legislative or judicial-the
requirements of Gray v. Sanders and Reynolds v. Sims must
be met, no question of that character is presented.6 4
Appraising this statement, Professor Dixon has noted that
"Justice Douglas seems to be saying two things: a state may
'appoint' non-legislative officers to avoid 'one man-one vote'; but
if there is an election, 'one man-one vote' applies regardless of
the character of the duties of the elective officials." 5 This
interpretation means, of course, that the election of judges by
districts must conform to the Reynolds formula. While the issue
was never directly faced, it appeared that in early decisions the
Supreme Court regarded judicial elections as part of the overall
reapportionment picture. Had this question arisen at the time of
62372 U.S. 368 (1963).
63 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
64 Id. at 111.
65R . DIXON, DEMOcRATiC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND
PoLrmcs 548 (1968).
[Vol 62,
EXEMPTION OF JuDICIAL ELECIONS
the Sailors litigation, the election of judges would have undoubt-
edly been included under the "one person, one vote" requirement.
Now, the situation has changed as recent appointments to the
Supreme Court have brought about a reversal in the trend
toward mathematical stringency and have been a factor in ex-
empting the judiciary from the equality principle. The current
trend is subject to criticism.
To begin with, the Hadley qualification states that the duties
of an elected official could be "so far removed from normal
governmental activities and so disproportionately affect different
groups that a popular election in compliance with Reynolds...
might not be required... ."66 An example of the type of public
office included in this stipulation would be a soil conservation
district in which the board members are elected only by those
people, usually farmers, who are affected by the government's
decisions. Also, some counties in southern states elect an officer
popularly known as the "cotton weigher" who checks the accuracy
of warehouse scales to protect the farmer from fraud, and gen-
erally, only farmers can vote for such officials.67 Throughout the
United States there are other special officers who perform unique
duties in local government. Their election by the people they
serve would not seem to affront the Constitution and subsequent
to Wells, the Supreme Court rendered a decision which illustrates
how the Hadley exception should be enforced. Salyer Land Co.
v. Tulare Lake Basin Water District68 concerned a California
statute providing for the election of the governing board in water
storage districts. Under this provision district landowners are
allowed to participate even if they are not residents, and votes
are apportioned among the landowners according to assessed
land valuations. This scheme was upheld in light of the district's
limited purposes and the disproportionate effect it had on the
landowners. Consequently, voting can be restricted to those who
own land in the district, and it is recognized that since some
landowners are affected more than others, they should have a
greater voice in the elections.
6O Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970).
67 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 13-101 (1962) (election of public weigher by
county governing body after petition of at least 50 cotton growers).
08 - U.S. - (1973).
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Salyer, it is submitted, illustrates the proper application of
the Hadley caveat, yet not even by the broadest extrapolation
is it possible to include judicial elections in the same category.
Obviously, the Wels three-judge panel read into the Hadley
caveat only what they wanted to apply. The Supreme Court
dissenters seemed to realize the fallacy of the lower court's logic
because they charged that it "seized upon the phrase 'persons
... to perform governmental functions' and concluded that such
persons were limited to 'officials who performed legislative or
executive type duties.'-" 9 But, for some inexplicable reason, even
the Wells dissent did not deal with the crucial principle that only
people disproportionately affected by an elected official are en-
titled to a greater vote. On this score alone the Hadley exemption
is inapplicable to the judiciary because the annals of American
jurisprudence teach that the courts deal equally with all people
who appear before the bench.
Clearly in the situations where courts decide cases between
litigant-voters it can be said that judges disproportionately effect
voters, yet this context is not analogous to Salyer and should not
bring judges within the purview of the Hadley exception. In
the broader and more proper sense, the effect of judicial decision-
making is the same for all citizens.
Conclusion
The impact of distinguishing judicial from executive and
legislative elections will be significant among the states. Although
a variety of systems are used to select judges, the most prevalent
method is by election. Currently, nineteen states choose all or
most of their judiciary by partisan ballot while eighteen states
employ a nonpartisan ballot.7 0 It is patently understood by the
legal profession, legislators, political scientists, public adminis-
trators and others concerned with the judicial process, that rul-
ings by the courts do affect public policy and, in effect, legislate.
This is particularly true of the highest courts of appeal where
most laws eventually undergo judicial scrutiny. It would seem
more consistent with the interests of democracy to require that
69 Wells v. Edwards, - U.S. - , - (1973) (dissenting opinion).7
oCouNcM OF STATE GovmT Es, TE BooK OF Tim STATEs 130-32
(1972).
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when judges are chosen by popular election, it must be in pur-
suance of an egalitarian principle. Otherwise, in the same man-
ner as legislatures, the state courts could, as a result of malap-
portionment, become unbalanced in favor of particular interests
and distort the democratic framework of our governmental and
political institutions.
